In 2019, the Western Cape high court found Prof Sean Davison guilty of assisting three men to die. They begged him repeatedly to relieve them of their suffering.
In respect of guilt, it is of no concern for our common law that the person was mentally competent to decide to end their life; nor that the person made that choice autonomously or freely; nor that the person’s suffering was intractable and unbearable; nor that the suffering stripped them of dignity. To assist — by means of voluntary euthanasia or assisting with suicide — is a crime, namely murder, even though neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime.
It is reasonable to infer from these sentences that assisting a terminally ill and severely suffering person is morally speaking significantly different from murder with evil intent. There is no malice. On the contrary. Thus our law is a blunt instrument that treats radically dissimilar kinds of actions similarly, at least in respect of finding someone guilty, if not sentencing.
It is evident that these rights support a right to assisted dying. And as such they clash with our common law that regards assistance with dying as murder. The SCA even mentions possible avenues for the development of our common law that could lead to decriminalising or legalising assisted dying:Consent as a defence; orThe SCA emphasised that it is the task of Parliament to make laws, not that of the courts.
Likewise, it could be argued that the SCA, in the Stransham-Ford appeal case, could have been more activist in respect of what is, after all, a constitutional vacuum that the court itself recognised.
I think about this often. I would hate to linger here on earth in pain and suffering. It should be my right to chose to end it.
I am so glad this is being brought up.